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Cold-Knowledge Blind BoxEpisode 51

How Did the US Railroad Bubble Drag Down the Whole Economy?

The railroads were real, and so was the bubble. In 1873, Americans bought the future at an inflated price.

Hi everyone, welcome to Cold-Knowledge Blind Box.

How are your stocks doing lately? Today we're talking about another bubble in history that burst: the US railroad bubble of 1873.

If you only look at the ending, you might think it was a bunch of crooks using a new technology to fleece people. But the problem is, railroads are not air. They really did connect America. They really made goods travel faster, cities grow, and the whole country change.

So if the technology was real and the demand was real, why did it still turn into a bubble?

This question may be more worth discussing than "why do bubbles burst?"

I

May 10, 1869. Promontory Summit, Utah Territory.

Two railroad construction crews finally met in the wilderness. The Union Pacific Railroad from the east and the Central Pacific Railroad from the west joined here. On site was a golden spike, with telegraph lines connected across the country. When the last hammer blow fell, the news reached major cities across the nation almost at once.

All of America was ecstatic.

In the past, traveling from the East Coast to the West Coast meant riding in a stagecoach, on horseback, sailing around South America, or risking your life crossing the wilderness, which could take months. Now a railroad spanning the continent compressed the journey to about a week.

Friends, this was not a PowerPoint slide or a concept video. It was a technological revolution you could see with your own eyes.

Railroads brought more than just speed. They could carry wheat from the Midwest to New York, bring machines from the East into the interior, and link mines, ranches, ports and factories into a single network. In the past, whether a place had business depended on how close it was to a river. From now on, whether a place could thrive depended on whether the trains stopped there.

So it was not foolish for people at the time to believe in railroads.

The real trouble was that they soon quietly swapped one true statement, "railroads will change America," for another: "anything that is a railroad will definitely make money."

These two sentences seem to differ by only a few words, but between them lies a graveyard.

II

To build a railroad across the continent, the biggest problem was not whether you had a dream, but who would pay for it.

Railroads were extremely expensive. You had to buy steel rails, wooden ties and locomotives, blast through mountains, build bridges, and hire thousands of workers. Even worse, before a railroad was finished, it earned almost nothing. And once it was finished, nobody knew whether there would be enough people and freight along the line.

Private capital did not dare bet on it alone, so the US government stepped in.

In 1862, Lincoln signed the Pacific Railway Act. The government supported the projects with bonds, and at the same time handed over large amounts of public land along the railroad routes to the companies. For some projects, the incentive could be understood this way: for every mile you laid forward, you got not only financing support but also large tracts of land on both sides of the line.

This design had its logic. Wild land was worth little at the time. Once the railroad was running, the land could be sold, so the government didn't need to hand over all the cash right away, yet it could still entice private companies to complete a national-scale project.

But it also created a very dangerous temptation.

How was a railroad company supposed to make money in the first place? Obviously by carrying people and goods from point A to point B, and collecting fares and freight charges.

But now, a company that hadn't yet hauled many cars of cargo could already get land, bonds and construction contracts simply by building track. So the question managers cared about most slowly shifted from "does this line have passengers?" to "can this line lay another fifty miles?"

The railroad turned from a transportation business into a race for mileage.

And the more elaborate maneuvers came later.

A group of insiders at the Union Pacific Railroad Company controlled a construction contractor called the Credit Mobilier. The name is long, so all you need to remember is that it was like a shadow double of the railroad company.

The left hand was the railroad company, responsible for raising money from the government and investors. The right hand was the construction company, responsible for quoting the price of building the track. Very often, the owners of both hands were the same people.

The result was quite imaginative.

The right hand inflated the construction costs, and the left hand accepted every bill. The railroad company carried a growing burden of costs on its books, while the shareholders of the construction company could pocket their profits in advance. Whether the trains would make money in the future was a future problem; whether the contractor could make money today was the real problem.

Later, a congressional investigation found that the company not only charged the railroad and the government excessive fees, but also gave profitable shares to some members of Congress, in an attempt to keep Washington from asking too many questions.

You see, before the railroad had even carried the nation's people to their destinations, part of the nation's wealth had already been delivered to a few individuals.

III

Still, government subsidies and insider deals alone could not inflate a nationwide bubble. What truly spread the railroad frenzy was bonds.

People building railroads needed money today, and promised to repay it with decades of future freight revenue. Investors who bought railroad bonds were effectively betting on one thing: wherever the tracks were laid, people, farms, mines and cities would follow. As long as America kept expanding westward, a line crossing the wilderness today would become a golden corridor tomorrow.

This story was very seductive, because it explained "there is no demand yet" as "demand is on its way."

The man who sold this story best was Jay Cooke. We'll call him "Old Cooke" from here on.

Old Cooke was not an ordinary banker. During the American Civil War, he helped the federal government sell war bonds to the public. His reputation, distribution network and credibility were all top-tier. Put simply, other people sold bonds on interest, while Old Cooke sold bonds on faith.

After the war ended, he set his sights on an even grander project: the Northern Pacific Railroad.

The line was planned to run from the Great Lakes region, across the northern prairies and the Rocky Mountains, all the way to the Pacific coast. On a map it looked like a zipper pulled open across the land, stitching together the whole northern part of the country.

The problem was that a line on a map is thin, but a railroad in reality is very expensive.

The route would pass through large areas with very few people. There were no big cities to provide passengers, and not enough freight revenue to pay off the debt right away. It had to burn money to lay track first, then wait for migrants, farms and commerce to slowly appear.

In other words, the Northern Pacific was not selling a railroad that was already making money. It was selling a world that would be created because of the railroad.

In 1870, construction officially began. Old Cooke's bank underwrote the bonds, then sold them through a vast sales network to investors in America and Europe. Every time the railroad extended forward, another batch of investors had to keep buying.

As long as the bonds sold well, the construction could continue. As long as construction continued, everyone believed even more that the bonds would keep selling.

It was a perfect cycle.

Until it stopped being a cycle.

IV

In 1873, the European financial markets ran into trouble first.

In May, the Vienna stock market crashed. By September, European investors had begun selling American railroad securities and pulling their money back. The funds that had been flowing steadily into American railroads suddenly began to ebb.

By then the Northern Pacific had been built as far as the area of today's North Dakota, but its costs kept running over budget, and the income along the line was far from enough. What it lacked most was not track, but the next person willing to take over its bonds.

On September 18, 1873, Old Cooke's bank announced it had suspended payments.

For Americans at the time, the shock was roughly like waking up in the morning to find that the nation's most reputable financial star, the man who could sell government bonds better than anyone, had announced in the afternoon: "Sorry, we can't get the money together."

Panic spread at once.

Investors rushed to banks and brokerages, and banks scrambled to call in their loans from railroad companies. The railroad companies had been relying on new money to finish old projects. Once financing stopped, half-laid rails stopped, workers went unpaid, and equipment suppliers could not collect their payments. What collapsed was not a single company, but a whole chain of companies that owed each other money.

On September 20, the New York Stock Exchange was forced to suspend trading. It was the first time in its history that it had closed its doors because of a financial panic.

Many railroad projects halted, banks and brokerage firms went bankrupt, and workers lost their jobs. The crisis was later known as the "Panic of 1873."

So when the American railroad bubble truly burst, it was not because one day everyone suddenly discovered that trains were useless.

Quite the opposite: trains were very useful.

What collapsed was something else: the unified vision of the future in which every line was worth building, every debt could be repaid, and every stretch of wilderness would become a city on schedule.

V

After the railroad bubble, did America stop building railroads?

Of course not.

The Northern Pacific later changed hands, construction continued, and it eventually linked up with the Pacific coast. America's railroad network kept expanding after that, and it truly shaped a national market.

This is what makes the story so interesting.

When a scam collapses, usually nothing is left behind. But when an infrastructure bubble bursts, the rails are still there, the stations are still there, and the bridges and tunnels are still standing. Later people could even take over assets that earlier investors had built at great cost, for a very low price.

Failed companies may have paved the way for a successful era.

But that is no comfort to the investors of the time. Because "society eventually benefits" and "you make money" have never been the same thing.

A railroad could be enormously important to a country and still leave its earliest shareholders and creditors with nothing, because it cost too much, the routes overlapped, demand arrived too late, and the debts were too heavy.

A technology could change the world beyond doubt and still fail to guarantee that every company flying its flag made a profit.

The biggest misunderstanding of the railroad bubble was that people treated technological progress, corporate profits and asset prices as one and the same thing.

In fact, they are three different things.

Technological progress answers: is this thing useful?

Corporate profit answers: who can use it to keep making money?

Asset prices answer: how much did we pay today for this future?

The first two answers can both be "yes," and the third can still be "it's too expensive."

So today, when we look at artificial intelligence, chips, data centers, or any technology called the "railroad of a new era," the question we really should ask may not be whether it will change the world.

It most likely will.

The harder questions are these: Who is building the tracks? Who is selling the shovels? Who is collecting the tolls? Who can only survive by constantly raising new money? And when everyone believes the future is coming, have we already paid for decades of good news up front in today's price?

The Americans of 1873 did not misjudge the railroads.

They simply imagined a long, winding future that had to be weeded out over time as a ticket that could be cashed in right away.

The railroads were real.

The bubble was real too.

And the most expensive lessons in history are often hidden exactly where both of these statements are true at once.

Well, that's the end of this episode of Cold-Knowledge Blind Box. See you next time!